Abstract. Secure multi-party computation (MPC) allows a set of n players to securely compute an agreed function of their inputs, even when up to t players are under the control of an (active or passive) adversary. In the information-theoretic model MPC is possible if and only if t < n/2 (where active security with t ≥ n/3 requires a trusted key setup). Known passive MPC protocols require a communication of O(n 2 ) field elements per multiplication. Recently, the same communication complexity was achieved for active security with t < n/3. It remained an open question whether O(n 2 ) complexity is achievable for n/3 ≤ t < n/2. We answer this question in the affirmative by presenting an active MPC protocol that provides optimal (t < n/2) security and communicates only O(n 2 ) field elements per multiplication. Additionally the protocol broadcasts O(n 3 ) field elements overall, for the whole computation. The communication complexity of the new protocol is to be compared with the most efficient previously known protocol for the same model, which requires broadcasting Ω(n 5 ) field elements per multiplication. This substantial reduction in communication is mainly achieved by applying a new technique called dispute control : During the course of the protocol, the players keep track of disputes that arise among them, and the ongoing computation is adjusted such that known disputes cannot arise again. Dispute control is inspired by the player-elimination framework. However, player elimination is not suited for models with t ≥ n/3.
Introduction

Background
Secure multi-party computation (MPC) enables a set of n players to securely evaluate an agreed function of their inputs even when t of the players are corrupted by a central adversary. A passive adversary can read the internal state of the corrupted players, trying to obtain information about the honest players' inputs. An active adversary can additionally make the corrupted players deviate from the protocol, trying to falsify the outcome of the computation. The MPC problem dates back to Yao [Yao82] . The first generic solutions presented in [GMW87, CDG87, GHY87] were based on cryptographic intractability
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Adv. Communication References t < n/2 passive O cM n 2 + n 2 κ [BGW88] t < n/3 active O cM n 2 + n 4 κ + O n 3 BC(κ)
[HM01] t < n/2 active O cM n 5 + n 4 κ + O cM n 5 + n 4 BC(κ) [CDD + 99] t < n/2 active O cM n 2 + n 5 κ κ + O n 3 BC(κ) this paper
Technically, the new protocol improves the approach of [CDD + 99] , which requires Ω(n 5 ) broadcasts per multiplication. We introduce a new concept, socalled dispute control, that allows to substantially reduce the communication complexity. The goal of dispute control is to reduce the frequency of faults that the adversary can provoke by identifying a pair of disputing players (at least one of them corrupted) whenever a fault is observed and preventing this pair from getting into dispute ever again. Hence, the number of faults that can occur during the whole protocol is limited to t(t + 1). This technique is inspired by the playerelimination framework [HMP00] , and shares many advantages with it. However, player elimination is not to be suited for models with t ≥ n/3. Furthermore, player elimination is not applicable in the input stage, which results in our protocol being more efficient than the protocol in [HM01] when the number of inputs is large (n 2 κ bits per input in our protocol versus n 4 κ bits in [HM01] ).
Protocol Overview
Model
We consider a set P of n players, P = {P 1 , . . . , P n }, which are connected with a complete network of secure synchronous channels. Furthermore, we assume the availability of broadcast channels. These can be simulated when a trusted setup is available [PW92] . The adversary corrupts up to t players for any fixed t with t < n/2, and makes them deviate from the protocol in any desired manner. The adversary is computationally unbounded, active, adaptive and rushing. The security of our protocols is information-theoretic with a negligible error probability of 2 −O(κ) for some security parameter κ.
For the ease of presentation, we always assume that the messages sent through the channels are from the right domain -if a player receives a message which is not in the right domain (e.g., no message at all), he replaces it with an arbitrary message from the specified domain.
The function to be computed is specified as an arithmetic circuit over a finite field F = GF (2 κ ), with input, addition, multiplication, random, and output gates. We denote the number of gates of each type by c I , c A , c M , c R , and c O .
Dispute Control
In the active model, the adversary can provoke inconsistencies among the honest players, who therefore regularly have to check their views and, in case of inconsistencies, invoke some fault-recovery procedure. These checks tend to be very expensive (they require invocations to a Byzantine agreement primitive), and must be performed even when no player deviates from the protocol.
The goal of dispute control is to reduce the frequency of faults by publicly identifying (localizing) a pair of disputing players (at least one of them corrupted) whenever a fault is observed and preventing this pair from getting into dispute ever again. Hence, the number of faults that can occur during the whole protocol is limited to t(t + 1).
The localized disputes are filed in a publicly known dispute set ∆ ⊆ P × P, a set of unordered pairs of players that are in dispute with each other. A pair {P i , P j } ∈ ∆ means that there is a dispute between P i and P j , hence either P i or P j (or both) are corrupted. Note that from the point of view of P i , the players {P j | {P i , P j } ∈ ∆} are corrupted, and P i doesn't care for them; in particular, he won't send or receive any private messages from them. As no honest player can be in dispute with more than t players, we automatically include the pairs {P i , P j } for every P j ∈ P once P i is involved in more than t disputes. Furthermore, we define the set X to be the set of players who are undoubtedly detected to be corrupted, i.e., those players who are in dispute with more than t other players.
Once dispute control is in place, we can take advantage of the fact that the number of faults during the protocol is limited and reduce the number of expensive consistency checks: We divide the protocol into n 2 segments, run each segment without any consistency checks and only at the end of the segment check all operations of the segment in a single verification step. If the verification fails, a new dispute is localized, and the segment is repeated. At most t(t+1) segments can fail, and the total number of segment evaluations (including repetitions) is at most n 2 + t(t + 1), hence the overhead for repeating failed segments is only a factor of 2. Formally the evaluation of each segment proceeds as follows:
1. Private (dispute-aware) computation. The effective protocol is computed very efficiently but non-robustly. This computation is adjusted to prevent faults due to disputes that are already registered in the dispute set ∆. In particular, players in dispute do not communicate with each other privately. 2. Fault detection. The players jointly find out whether or not a fault has occurred. This step typically requires each player to broadcast one bit indicating whether or not he observed an inconsistency within the current segment. If no fault is reported, then the computation of the segment is completed, and the next segment is evaluated. If at least one fault is reported, we say that the segment has failed, and the following step is performed. 3. Fault localization and dispute control. The players publicly identify a pair {P i , P j } of players, where at least one of them is corrupted and has deviated from the protocol, and who are not yet registered in ∆. Then we set ∆ ← ∆ ∪ {P i , P j } and restart the current segment.
Three-Level Secret-Sharing
We use three different levels of secret-shadings, all based on Shamir's sharing [Sha79] , ameliorated with dispute control. The weakest level, called 1D-sharing, is a polynomial sharing scheme, where the shares of players who are in dispute with the dealer (implicitly) receive a fixed-0 share, called Kudzu-share. In order to 1D-share a value s, the dealer P D selects a random degree-t polynomial f (x) with f (0) = s and f (i) = 0 for every {P D , P i } ∈ ∆, and sends the shares s i = f (i) to every P i ∈ P (the Kudzu-shares are not really sent; instead, the receiver sets his share to 0). A protocol VSS1D for verifiably 1D-share a bunch of values will be given in Section 3.2. Note that 1D-sharings are not robust; reconstruction requires that all players (except those with Kudzu-shares) cooperate.
However, they are detectable in the sense that it can be decided whether or not the reconstruction was successful. The middle level of secret sharing, called 2D-sharing, is a two-level polynomial sharings scheme: The share s i of each player P i ∈ P is 1D-shared among the players (for dealer P i ). More precisely, a value s is 2D-shared when there exists degree-t polynomials f, f 1 , . . . , f n with f (0) = s and, for i = 1, . . . , n, f i (0) = f (i) and ∀P j ∈ P : {P i , P j } ∈ ∆ → f i (j) = 0. Every player P i ∈ P holds a share s i = f (i) of s, the polynomial f i (x) for sharing s i , and a shareshare s ji = f j (i) of the share s j of every player P j ∈ P. We say that P i owns the 1D-sharing of s i , which means in particular that players who are in dispute with P i hold 0 as share-share of s i . We will never have a dealer 2D-share a value; instead, we will upgrade 1D-sharings (or rather sums of 1D-sharings) to 2D-sharings, using protocol Upgrade1Dto2D. Note that also 2D-sharings are not robust.
The strongest level of secret sharing, called 2D * -sharing, is a 2D-sharing, where in addition, the share-shares are secured with information checking (see Section 3.5). More precisely, for each share-share s ij (which is not a Kudzu-share, i.e., {P i , P j } / ∈ ∆), the owner P i of the sharing has provided authentication tags for every verifier P V ∈ P who is neither in dispute with the owner P i nor the recipient P j , i.e., {P V , P i } / ∈ ∆ and {P V , P j } / ∈ ∆. These authentication tags allow P V in the reconstruction to verify the correctness of the received shareshares; hence, 2D * -sharings are robust. Actually, P i does not distribute authentication tags for every single share-share s ij , but rather for huge collections of many share-shares s (1) ij , . . . , s ( ) ij , and P V can only verify the correctness of all share-shares at once. Also 2D * -sharings are never distributed by a dealer; instead, we will upgrade collections of 2D-sharings to 2D * -sharings, using protocol Upgrade2Dto2D * .
Main Protocol
The main protocol proceeds in three phases (each making use of segmentation and dispute control):
Preparation phase: The preparation phase uses the circuit-randomization technique of Beaver [Bea91a] : A number of so-called multiplication triples (a, b, c) with c = ab are generated and shared among the players. These triples will then be used in the computation phase for efficiently multiplying shared values. Furthermore, a number of random values are generated and shared, which will be used as outputs of random gates. Input phase: In the input phase, every player with input shares his input among the players. Computation phase: In the computation phase, the circuit is evaluated gate by gate (level by level), with help of the prepared multiplication triples and the random values. Given the sharings of the multiplication triples, the random values, and the inputs, the computation phase is fully deterministic. Indeed, the computation phase can be seen as a sequence of reconstructions of known linear combinations of shared values.
Each phase uses dispute control. We initialize the dispute set ∆ = {} and enter the first segment of the preparation phase. Then we evaluate segment by segment, and with each segment that fails and is to be repeated, the dispute set ∆ grows. Once all segments of the preparation phase have succeeded, the players move on to the first segment of the input phase. Also in this phase, segments can fail and have to be repeated. This allows corrupted players to change their inputs. However, as the adversary obtains no information about whatsoever in the input phase, this does not affect the independence of the inputs. Once all input segments have succeeded, the players move on to the first segment of the computation phase. In this phase, the players (and hence also the adversary) do obtain information about their outputs; however, the computation stage is fully deterministic. Even when a segment fails (and is repeated) after the adversary has learned some output, he cannot influence the outputs of the honest players anymore.
In the preparation phase and in the input phase, the private computation is highly parallelized. All proposed sub-protocols process many inputs at once, producing many outputs. This helps reducing the costs for the fault detection and localization, as for all parallel instances, only one single fault-handling procedure is executed. Often, instead of verifying single instances of some test data, we will verify a random linear combination of many instances. Note that the protocols themselves do not use broadcast, but fault handling does.
Sub-Protocols
All sub-protocols have a private (dispute aware) computation, a fault detection and a fault localization. They can succeed or fail and the players always agree (using broadcast) on what is the case. In case of a failure the public output of the sub-protocol is a (new) pair of players E = {P i , P j } / ∈ ∆ such as either P i or P j (or both) are corrupted. If some invoked sub-protocol fails with E = {P i , P j } then the invoking sub-protocol fails with E = {P i , P j } and is aborted (this abort will be handled in the main protocol).
Dispute-Control Broadcast
The protocol DC-Broadcast allows every sender P S ∈ P \ X to distribute a vector of values s
(1,S) , . . . , s ( ,S) among the players in P \X , such that it is guaranteed that all honest recipients receive the same vectors (or the protocol fails).
This protocol is rather simple: Every sender directly transmits his vector to the players he is not in dispute with, and via another player to those players he is in dispute with. Then the players pairwisely compare their vectors by using universal hash functions [CW79] . As universal hash with key k ∈ F, we use the function
The probability that two different vectors map to the same hash value for a uniformly chosen key is at most /|F|, which is negligible in our setting with F = GF (2 κ ).
Protocol DC-Broadcast.
Private Computation:
The following steps are executed in parallel for every sender P S ∈ P \ X : 1.1 P S sends s (1,S) , . . . , s ( ,S) to every P i with {P S , P i } / ∈ ∆. 1.2 For every P i with {P S , P i } ∈ ∆ (but P i / ∈ X ), the smallest player P i with {P S , P i } / ∈ ∆ and {P i , P i } / ∈ ∆ forwards s (1,S) , . . . , s ( ,S) to P i .
2
We call P i the proxy of P i . 2. Fault Detection: The following steps are executed in parallel for every verifier P V ∈ P \ X : 2.1 P V selects a key k V ∈ R F for a universal hash function U k and sends it to every P i with
2.3 P V broadcasts a bit "accept" or "reject", indicating whether for every P S ∈ P \X , the hash values h S,i of each P i with {P V , P i } / ∈ ∆ are equal. If every verifier P V ∈ P \X broadcasts "accept" in Step 2.3, then the protocol succeeds and terminates. 3. Fault Localization: The following steps are executed for the smallest P V ∈ P \ X reporting a fault. 3.1 P V selects S, i, j such that P S / ∈ X , {P V , P i } / ∈ ∆, and {P V , P j } / ∈ ∆, and h S,i = h S,j , and broadcasts S, i, j, h S,i , h S,j , and k = k V . 3.2 We denote the proxies of P i and P j by P i and P j , respectively (if no proxy exists, we set i = i, respectively j = j). The players P S , P i , P j , P i , P j all compute and broadcast a hash value with key k of their vector s (1,S) , . . . , s ( ,S) , denoted as h S , h i , h j , h i , h j , respectively. The protocol fails with E being the first pair (P V , P i ), (P i , P i ), (P i , P S ), (P S , P j ), (P j , P j ), or (P j , P V ), where
Lemma 1. If DC-Broadcast succeeds, then with overwhelming probability, for each sender P S ∈ P \ X , all honest players in P hold the same vector s (1,S) , . . . , s ( ,S) , which is the vector of P S if honest. If the protocol fails, a new dispute pair E is localized. The protocol communicates O( n 2 + n 3 ) and broadcasts O(n) field elements.
Proof. In order to prove that all honest players output the same vector s
(1,S) , . . . , s ( ,S) when the protocol succeeds, consider two honest players P i and P j . As both P i and P j are honest, {P i , P j } / ∈ ∆ holds, and P i and P j have mutually exchanged universal hash values in Step 2. Hence, with overwhelming probability, a difference in the vectors would have been detected and the protocol would have failed. It follows immediately from the protocol that when P S is honest and the protocol succeeds, then all honest players receive the vector directly from P S . When the protocol fails with dispute pair E, then one can verify by inspection that the two players in E disagree on a value they have privately exchanged, hence either of the players must be faulty. And as players in dispute do not communicate with each other, the localized dispute pair is new.
Verifiable Secret-Sharing
The protocol VSS1D allows every dealer P D ∈ P \ X to verifiably 1D-share values s (1,D) , . . . , s ( ,D) resulting in each player P i ∈ P \ X holding the shares
for each dealer P D . The correctness of these sharings is verified by letting every player take on the role of a verifier P V and inspect a random linear combination of the sharings of each dealer P D . For privacy reasons, each such random linear combination is blinded with a random 1D-sharing, i.e., every dealer P D 1D-shares additional n blinding values
2. Fault Detection: Every verifier P V ∈ P \ X selects a random challenge vector (r (1,V ) , . . . , r ( ,V ) ). Then, DC-Broadcast is invoked to let every verifier P V ∈ P \ X distribute his vector among the players P i ∈ P \ X . Then the following steps are executed for every verifier P V ∈ P \ X (we suppress the index V and denote the challenge vector (r (1) , . . . , r ( ) )):
2.1 For every dealer P D , the random linear combination f ( * ,D) (x) of his 1D-sharings is defined as 
For each dealer
Lemma 2. If VSS1D succeeds, then with overwhelming probability, the values s (1,D) , . . . , s ( ,D) of each dealer P D ∈ P\X are correctly 1D-shared. If the protocol fails, then the localized pair E = {P i , P j } is new (i.e., E / ∈ ∆) and either P i or P j (or both) are corrupted. The privacy of the inputs of the honest players is guaranteed through the whole protocol (even if the protocol fails). The protocol communicates O( n 2 + n 3 ) and broadcasts O(n) field elements.
Proof. In order to prove the correctness, first consider a dealer P D , an honest verifier P V , the (by
and the blinding value s ( +V,D) . Assume that the sharing of one of the values is not a correct 1D-sharing, i.e., the shares of the honest players (including the Kudzu shares) lie on a polynomial of degree higher than t. Then there are at most 2 κ( −1) (out of 2 κ ) challenge vectors (r (1) , . . . , r ( ) ) ∈ F such that the sharing of
is a correct 1D-sharing, i.e. the polynomial defined by the shares of the honest players is of degree t. As the verifier P V chooses his challenge vector uniformly at random and gets the correctly linearly combined shares from all honest players (an honest verifier is in dispute with no honest player), the probability of him not detecting the fault is at most 2 κ( −1) /2 κ = 1/2 κ . Thus the probability that the protocol succeeds in case of at least one faulty sharing (from any dealer) is negligible.
The privacy of the inputs of the honest players follows from the fact that up to t shares give no information about the secret and from the fact that the reconstructed linear combinations are blinded with a random value chosen by the dealer himself (for every verifier a different one) and are so (for every honest dealer) statistically independent from the dealers secret. If the protocol fails, then the localized dispute pair consists of two players who have publicly disagreed on a value they have privately exchanged in some previous step (or a value computed from such values), therefore it is obvious, that at least one of them is corrupted. As only players who are not in dispute with each other communicate privately, the localized dispute is a new one.
We present a protocol for reconstructing sums of correct 1D-sharings. Consider a set P D ⊆ P \ X of dealers and a set P R ⊆ P \ X of recipients and the actual dispute set ∆. Every dealer P D ∈ P D has verifiably 1D-shared (with the actual ∆) summands s (1,D) 
we denote the (implicitly defined) share of each player P i ∈ P by s
Protocol Reconstruct1D.
Private Computation:
For every m = 1, . . . , , every player P i ∈ P computes his sum share s
, and sends it to every P R ∈ P R with {P i , P R } / ∈ ∆. Every P R ∈ P R checks for each m = 1, . . . , whether the received shares lie on a polynomial f (m) (x) of degree t. If so, it follows that
2. Fault Detection: Every P R ∈ P R broadcasts "accept" or "reject", indicating whether he could reconstruct all values s (m) for m = 1, . . . , in Step 1. If all recipients broadcast "accept", then the protocol succeeds and terminates. 3. Fault Localization: The following steps are executed for the smallest complaining recipient P R ∈ P R . 3.1 P R broadcasts the index m of the polynomial f (m) (x) he could not reconstruct. 3.2 Every player P i with {P i , P R } / ∈ ∆ sends to P R his summand shares s (m,D) i for every dealer P D ∈ P D with {P i , P D } / ∈ ∆. 3.3 P R verifies for every P i with {P i , P R } / ∈ ∆ that the provided summand shares add up to the previously provided sum share, i.e.,
. 4 In case of a fault, P R broadcasts the index i of the bad player P i , and the protocol fails with E = {P i , P R }. do not define a correct 1D-sharing for dealer P D , i.e., there is no degree-t polynomial f (x) with f (i) = s (m,D) i for every i with {P i , P R } / ∈ ∆ and {P i , P D } / ∈ ∆, and f (i) = 0 (Kudzu) for every i with {P i , P R } / ∈ ∆ and {P i , P D } ∈ ∆. 3.5 Every player P i with {P i , P R } / ∈ ∆ and {P i , P D } / ∈ ∆ broadcasts his summand share s (m,D) i . 3.6 If the broadcasted summand shares define a correct 1D-sharing for dealer P D , then P R broadcasts the index i of a player P i who has broadcasted a different value s
Step 3.5 than he has privately sent to P R in Step 3.2, and the protocol fails with E = {P i , P R }. Otherwise, when the broadcasted summand shares do not define a correct 1D-sharing for P D , then P D broadcasts the index i of a player P i who has broadcasted a wrong share s
, and the protocol fails with E = {P i , P D }.
Lemma 3. If the values s
( 1,D) , . . . , s ( ,D) of each P D ∈ P D are correctly 1D-shared (for the actual ∆), then the following holds: If Reconstruct1D succeeds, then the privacy is guaranteed and every value reconstructed towards an honest recipient lies on the degree t polynomial defined by the (at least t + 1) shares of the honest players. If the protocol fails then the localized pair E = {P i , P j } is new and contains at least one corrupted player. The protocol communicates O( n 2 ) and broadcasts O(n) field elements.
Proof. As an honest verifier is not in dispute with any other honest player, he will receive at least t + 1 shares of the honest players, which uniquely define a degree t polynomial. If the shares received from the corrupted players lie on this polynomial, he will reconstruct the right secret, otherwise the interpolated polynomial will be of degree higher then t and the protocol will fail. The rest follows (along the lines of proof of Lemma 2) from inspection of the protocol.
Generating Random Challenges
The following protocol allows the players to generate a publicly known (i.e., to the players in P \ X ) challenge vector s (1) , . . . , s ( ) , or the protocol fails, if one of the sub-protocols fails, and outputs a new dispute pair E = {P i , P j }:
Protocol GenerateChallenges. 1. Every player P k ∈ P \ X selects a random summand vector s (1,k) , . . . , s ( ,k) .
2. Invoke VSS1D to let every P k verifiably 1D-share his summand vector. 3. Invoke the protocol Reconstruct1D (with P D = P R = P \ X ) to reconstruct the sum sharings
Lemma 4. If GenerateChallenges succeeds, then with overwhelming probability, the generated values are uniformly distributed. If the protocol fails, then the localized dispute pair E = {P i , P j } is new and contains at least one corrupted player. The protocol communicates O( n 2 + n 3 ) and broadcasts O(n) field elements.
Upgrading 1D-Sharings to 2D-Sharings
We present a protocol for upgrading sums of 1D-sharings to 2D-sharings. The given 1D-sharings must be for the actual ∆; the correctness of these sharings is implicitly verified in the upgrade protocol and must not be a priori guaranteed. The protocol outputs correct 2D-sharings or it fails with a new dispute pair E.
Formally, we consider a set P D ⊆ P \ X of dealers, where each dealer P D ∈ P D has (for the actual ∆) 1D-shared summands s (1,D) , . . . , s ( ,D) with the polynomials f
(1,D) (x), . . . , f ( ,D) (x). We denote the share of f (m,D) (x) for player 
Protocol Upgrade1Dto2D.
Private Computation:
The players first jointly generate a sharing of an additional randomly chosen value s ( +1) . Then, all +1 sharings are upgraded to 2D-sharings, and the correctness is verified with destroying the privacy of this blinding value. 1.1 Every dealer P D ∈ P D picks a random summand s ( +1,D) and 1D-shares it among the players with polynomial f ( +1,D) (x), resulting in every player P i holding a share s ( +1,D) i . 1.2 For every m = 1, . . . , + 1, every player P i ∈ P \ X computes his sum share s
, and 1D-shares it with the polynomial
We denote the share-shares as s (m) ij . The 1D-sharing of detected players P i ∈ X is the constant-0 sharing (all share-shares are Kudzu). 2. Fault Detection: In order to verify the correctness of the resulting sharings, the players jointly generate a random challenge vector (r (1) , . . . , r ( ) ) ∈ F using the protocol GenerateChallenges. Then, the correctness of the 2D-sharing of the random linear combination m=1 r (m) s (m) + s ( +1) will be verified (in parallel) by every player P V ∈ P \ X . We denote the linearly combined polynomials by
The following steps are performed in parallel for every verifier P V ∈ P \ X : 2.1 Every P j with {P V , P j } / ∈ ∆ computes and sends to P V the following linear combinations of his share-shares for every i = 1, . . . , n with
. 2.2 P V checks for each i = 1, . . . , n, whether the received share-shares s ij define a valid 1D-sharing for dealer P i , i.e., there exists a polynomial f i (x) with f i (j) = s ij for every j with {P V , P j } / ∈ ∆ and {P i , P j } / ∈ ∆, and f i (j) = 0 (i.e., Kudzu) for every j with {P i , P j } ∈ ∆, 5 and broadcasts a bit "accept" or "reject". 2.3. P V checks that the first-level sharing f 1 (0), . . . , f n (0) is a valid Shamir- sharing of degree t and broadcasts "accept" or "reject".
If all verifiers P V broadcast "accept" in Steps 2.2 and 2.3, the protocol succeeded and terminates. 3. Fault Localization: The following steps are executed for the smallest complaining verifier P V . 3.1 If the reported fault was in Step 2.2, i.e., P V observed that one of the second-level sharings is not a correct 1D-sharing, the following steps are executed: 3.1.1 P V broadcasts the index i of the invalid second-level sharing. 3.1.2 Every P j with {P j , P V } / ∈ ∆ and {P j , P i } / ∈ ∆ broadcasts s ij . 3.1.3 If the broadcasted shares define a correct 1D-sharing, then there exists a player P j with {P j , P V } / ∈ ∆ who has broadcasted a different value than he has privately sent to P V in Step 2.1. P V broadcasts his index j, and the protocol fails with E = {P V , P j }. If the broadcasted shares do not define a correct 1D-sharing, the owner P i of this second-level sharing broadcasts the index j of a player P j (with {P i , P j } / ∈ ∆) who has broadcasted a wrong share s ij = f i (j), and the protocol fails with E = {P i , P j }. 3.2 If the observed fault was in Step 2.3, i.e., P V could correctly interpolate each second-level sharing f 1 (x), . . . , f n (x), but the interpolated values f 1 (0), . . . , f n (0) do not define a valid (first-level) Shamir-sharing of degree t, 6 then the following steps are executed.
For every dealer
. Accordingly, for every dealer P D , every player P i with {P i , P D } / ∈ ∆ and {P i , P V } / ∈ ∆ sends to P V his share s
7 If the check fails for some P i , then P V broadcasts i, and the protocol fails with E = {P V , P i }. 3.2.3 P V broadcasts the index D of P D such that the received shares s
(for every i with {P i , P D } / ∈ ∆ and {P i , P V } / ∈ ∆) do not define a correct 1D-sharing. 3.2.4 Every P i ∈ P with {P i , P V } / ∈ ∆ and {P i , P D } / ∈ ∆ broadcasts his share s , and the protocol fails with E = {P D , P i }.
Lemma 5. If Upgrade1Dto2D succeeds, then with overwhelming probability, the upgraded sharings are correct 2D-sharings. If the protocol fails, then the localized pair E = {P i , P j } is new and contains at least one corrupted player. The privacy of the shared values is guaranteed through the whole protocol (even if it fails). The protocol communicates O( n 2 + n 3 ) and broadcasts O(n) field elements.
Proof. Along the lines of the proof of Lemma 2.
Information Checking with Dispute Control
An information-checking (IC) scheme allows a sender to deliver a message to a recipient in such a way that the recipient can later forward the message and prove its authenticity to a designated verifier. More precisely, an IC-scheme for a sender P S , recipient P R , and verifier P V , consists of two protocols:
The sender P S delivers the message m and some authentication tag y to P R and some checking tag z to P V . IC-Reveal: The recipient P R forwards m and y to P V , who uses z to verify the authenticity of m, and either accepts or rejects m.
Our information-checking protocol is a variant of the information-checking protocol of [CDD + 99] with two modifications. First, our IC-Distr protocol may fail in case of a fault; then, a dispute among two of the three players is identified.
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Second, our protocol supports authenticating long messages m = (m 1 , . . . , m ) ∈ F without additional costs.
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For authenticating m = (m 1 , . . . , m ), a random degree-polynomial f (x) with f (i) = m i for i = 1, . . . , is chosen, then the authentication tag is y = f (0) and the verification tag is a random point z = (u, v) with f (u) = v and u ≥ . One can easily verify that this approach satisfies completeness, secrecy, and correctness (with error probability /(|F| − − 1)) as long as the tags are computed as indicated. In order to ensure that the sender computes the tags correctly, we use a cut-and-choose proof: The sender generates and distributes κ independent tags, and the verifier hands half of them to the recipient, who checks them. The concrete protocols are given in the sequel:
Protocol IC-Distr. 1. Private Computation: The sender P S , holding message m = (m 1 , . . . , m ), selects uniformly at random κ authentication tags y 1 , . . . , y κ ∈ R F κ , κ elements u 1 , . . . , u κ ∈ R (F \ {0, . . . , }) κ , and computes v 1 , . . . , v κ such that for each i ∈ {1, . . . , κ}, the + 2 points (0, y i ), (1, m 1 ) , . . . , ( , m ), (u i , v i ) lie on a polynomial of degree . P S sends the message m and the authentication tags y 1 , . . . , y κ to P R and the verification tags z 1 = (u 1 , v 1 ) , . . . , z κ = (u κ , v κ ) to P V . 2. Fault Detection:
2.1 P V partitions the index set {1, . . . , κ} into two partitions I and I of (almost) equal size, and sends I, I, and z i for every i ∈ I to P R . 2.2 P R checks whether for every i ∈ I, the points (0, y i ), (1, m 1 ) , . . . , ( , m ), z i lie on a polynomial of degree , and broadcasts either "accept" (and the protocol succeeded) or "reject". 3. Fault Localization: If P R broadcasted "reject", the protocol fails and:
3.1 P R selects i ∈ I such that the verification tag z i received from P V does not match with the message m and the authentication tag y i received from P S , and broadcasts i and z i . 3.2 P S and P V broadcast z i . 3.3 If the z i -s broadcasted by P S and P V differ, then E = {P S , P V }. Otherwise, if the z i -s broadcasted by P R and P V differ, then E = {P R , P V }.
Otherwise, E = {P S , P R }.
Protocol IC-Reveal. 1. The recipient P R sends the message m and the authentication tags y i for i ∈ I to the verifier P V . 2. The verifier with verification tags z 1 , . . . , z accepts m = (m 1 , . . . , m ) if for any i ∈ I, the points (0, y i ), (1, m 1 ), . . . , ( , m ), z i form a polynomial of degree ; otherwise, he rejects m.
Lemma 6. If IC-Distr succeeds and P V , P R are honest, then with overwhelming probability P V accepts the message m in IC-Reveal (completeness). If IC-Distr fails, then the localized pair E contains at least one corrupted player. If P S and P V are honest, then with overwhelming probability, P V rejects any fake message m = m in IC-Reveal (correctness). If P S and P R are honest, then P V obtains no information about m in IC-Distr (even if it fails) (privacy).
Proof. Completeness: If the cut-and-choose proof is successful, then the probability that at least one of the remaining authentication tags is valid is at least 1 − κ/2 κ . Correctness: The probability that an corrupted receiver can produce at least one correct tag for a message m = m is equal to the probability, that he can guess at least one verification point z i , which is less than κ/(2 κ − − 1). Privacy follows from the fact that the verification tag is statistically independent from the message.
Upgrading 2D-Sharings to 2D
* -Sharings
The following protocol upgrades 2D-sharings to 2D * -sharings. We denote the 2D-shared values by s (m) (for m = 1, . . . , ), the shares of each player P i ∈ P by
, and P j s share-share of s Protocol Upgrade2Dto2D * .
1. For every triple of players P i , P j , P k ∈ P with no dispute among them (i.e.,
, the protocol IC-Distr is invoked for the message m = (s (1) ij , . . . , s ( ) ij ) with sender P i , receiver P j and verifier P k . The message is not really sent, as P j already holds it. Furthermore, these up to n 3 parallel invocations are merged when it comes to fault-detection and fault-localization: Every player P j broadcasts one single bit in the faultdetection, indicating whether he observed a fault in one of the instances he acted as recipient. Then, the smallest player P j that reported a fault, broadcasts i and k, indicating the instance i, j, k in which he observed the fault, and fault-localization is invoked only for this instance.
Lemma 7. If the 2D-sharings to be upgraded are correct (for the actual ∆) and the protocol Upgrade2Dto2D * succeeds, then the upgraded 2D * -sharings are with overwhelming probability correct. If the protocol fails, then the output pair E is new and contains at least one corrupted player. The privacy of the shared values is guaranteed through the whole protocol (even if it fails). The protocol communicates O(n 3 κ) and broadcasts O(n) field elements.
ABC-Protocol
The following protocol allows every player P k ∈ P \ X to prove that for every m = 1, . . . , , the (for the actual ∆ correctly) 1D-shared value c The intuition of the ABC protocol is the following (where we denote the factors as a and b and the product as c): The prover shares a random a and c = ab, i.e., (a, b, c) is a multiplication triple, and proves for a random challenge r, that the shared triple (ra+a, b, rc+c) is a correct multiplication triple. This is achieved by first reconstructing a = ra+a, and then verifying that z = ab−rc−c is a sharing of 0. For the sake of efficiency, we parallelize this ABC-proof for many triples and amortize the verification. Instead of reconstructing the sharing of each a, we ask the prover to send the (alleged) values a to every player; who then verify that a random linear combination of these sharings reconstructs to the linear combination of the alleged values. Analogously, instead of verifying each z to be zero, the players reconstruct a random linear combination of these values, which must be zero.
1.2 If P k received all shares s i he was supposed to get (i.e., there was no empty message ), and the received shares lie on a polynomial f (x) of degree t, he computes the output value as s = f (0); otherwise P k observes a fault and aborts the segment, i.e., for the rest of the segment, P k only sends empty messages. 2. Fault Detection: Every player P i ∈ P \ X broadcasts the index q i of the first failed reconstruction operation, respectively ⊥ if he successfully completed the segment. If all players broadcast ⊥, then the evaluation of the current segment succeeded 3. Fault Localization: Execute the following steps for the player P k with the smallest q k , for the failed reconstruction operation with index q k : 3.1 Every player P i with {P k , P i } / ∈ ∆ sends the polynomial f i (x) = L(f ji , . . .) to P k . 3.2 If for some P i with {P k , P i } / ∈ ∆, P k did not receive s i in Step 1.1, or the provided polynomial f i (x) is inconsistent with s i (i.e., f i (0) = s i ), then P k broadcasts i, and the fault localization terminates with E = {P k , P i }. 3.3 P k identifies two players P i , P j with {P k , P i } / ∈ ∆ and {P k , P j } / ∈ ∆, such that f i (j) = s ij , 17 and broadcasts (i, j, s ij , f i (j)).
3.4 Both P i and P j broadcast a bit indicating whether or not they agree with the values broadcasted by P k . If P i (respectively P j ) disagrees, the fault localization terminates with E = {P k , P i } (respectively E = {P k , P j }). 3.5 As both P i and P j agree with s ij respectively f i (j) as broadcasted by P k , and as f i (j) = s ij , either P i or P j delivered a wrong value to P k . P j can use the information checking scheme to prove to P k the correctness of s ij . However, there are no authentication tags for s ij itself, but s ij is computed as a publicly known linear combination L of base sharings, for which authentication tags exist (one authentication tag for all shareshares x ij of each segment), respectively which are Kudzu and hence publicly known. Hence, P j executes the protocol IC-Reveal for revealing the provably correct share-shares x ij of every base sharing x, and if P k accepts all invocations and the linear combination on the shareshares yields s ij , then P k broadcasts i and E = {P k , P i }, otherwise, P k broadcasts j and E = {P k , P j }.
Lemma 11. If all base values are correctly 2D * -shared and all multiplication triples are correct and random, then with overwhelming probability, the circuit evaluation as described above is correct, robust and private. The protocol communicates O((c I n 2 + c M n 2 + c R n 2 + c O n + n 4 )κ) and broadcasts O(n 3 ) field elements.
Proof. Once the base values are correctly 2D * -shared, the computation phase is purely deterministic. An honest player will never reconstruct a wrong secret:
